South Carolina Law Review
Volume 40
Issue 1 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW

Article 5

Fall 1988

Constitutional Law
William L. Monts III
Jeffrey M. Nelson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
William L. Monts III & Jeffrey M. Nelson, Constitutional Law, 40 S. C. L. Rev. 29 (1988).

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Monts and Nelson: Constitutional Law

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I.

WARRANT AUTHORIZING SEIZURE OF VIDEOTAPES HELD
UNCONSTITUTIONAL

While the General Assembly debated the merits of a new
obscenity statute during the 1987 legislative year, the state supreme court addressed the constitutional limitations placed on
police seizures of allegedly obscene materials. In State v. Hall1
the court held that a warrant authorizing search of a movie
rental company and seizure of "suspect material" was too broad
to withstand scrutiny under both the state obscenity statute existing at the time and the fourth amendment.2
In 1985 Darlington police officers purchased four adult videotapes from Darlington Home Movie Rentals, a business owned
by appellant David Hall. They took the tapes to Judge Sidney
Floyd, who viewed the movies and determined them to be obscene. Based on his determination, Floyd issued a warrant authorizing a search of Hall's store as well as seizure of the four
videotapes and "additional and like suspect material." Pursuant
to the warrant, Darlington police subsequently seized forty-five
tapes from Hall's business.
In July 1986 Hall, claiming that the seizure was improper,
moved before Judge Ralph Anderson to have the forty-five tapes
returned.' Judge Anderson denied the motion on the ground
that he had no authority to disturb Judge Floyd's order.4 Hall
appealed; the supreme court reversed.
The court relied on both statutory and constitutional
1. 293 S.C. 331, 360 S.E.2d 323 (1987).
2. Id. at 333, 360 S.E.2d at 324.
3. The State never indicted Hall for possessing or disseminating any of the fortyfive videotapes seized. He did face charges resulting from the initial purchase of four
videotapes by the police. He pleaded guilty to one count of disseminating obscene material; the other three counts were dismissed. Hall did not challenge the constitutionality
of the original purchase of the four videotapes by the police because that purchase did
not constitute a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. See Maryland v.
Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985) (purchase of allegedly obscene materials by police officers
held not a seizure within meaning of fourth amendment).
4. 293 S.C. at 332, 360 S.E.2d at 324.
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grounds in reaching its decision. It noted that section 16-15270(e) of the South Carolina Code required a warrant authorizing seizure of allegedly obscene videotapes to "identify the material to be seized by name, title or fair description."5 As such,
the statute imposed "a limitation upon the search and seizure"
of the videotapes.6 By permitting the seizure of "additional and
like suspect material," the court concluded, the warrant failed to
comply with the statute and was thus "impermissibly broad and
so nondescriptive as to render the resulting warrant a general
warrant, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. '7 The court ordered the forty-five tapes returned to Hall.
As a matter of statutory interpretation, Hall is of minimal
precedential value. The General Assembly amended the state's
obscenity statute in 1987.8 The amendment repealed section 1615-270, which governed the issuance of warrants for seizures of
allegedly obscene material.9 In its place, the legislature enacted a
statute containing no similar provisions. The new obscenity law
merely requires that warrants be issued only upon the request of

5. At the time the police seized Hall's videotapes, the state obscenity statute,
which was then in effect, outlined procedures for issuance of warrants in great detail. See
S.C. CODs ANN. § 16-15-270 (Law. Co-op. 1976). The relevant portions of that section

read:
(d) A circuit judge may issue warrants for search and seizure to authorize
seizure of single copies of suspect material in order to preserve evidence, but
only after he has determined the existence of probable cause based upon a
viewing of the allegedly obscene material itself or upon examination of factual
allegations contained in any affidavit in support of such warrant.
(e) Any warrant or order of seizure shall describe with particularity the premises to be searched and identify material to be seized by name, title or fair
description. Execution and return thereon shall be in accordance with the provisions of § 17-13-140.
This section tracks the constitutional requirements imposed upon police in seizing allegedly obscene material. See infra text accompanying notes 12-30.
See also § 16-15-270(b), requiring proceedings prescribed by section 16-15-270 be "examined, heard and disposed of with the maximum promptness and dispatch commensurate with the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of this State."
6. 293 S.C. at 333, 360 S.E.2d at 324 (citing State v. Barrett, 278 S.C. 92, 292
S.E.2d 590 (1982)).
7. Id. at 333, 360 S.E.2d at 324. As an alternative ground for the decision, the
court might have noted that § 16-15-270(d) only permitted the circuit judge to issue
warrants authorizing seizures of "single copies of suspect material." The seizure in this
case clearly went beyond this limitation. The court, however, did not address that issue.
8. 1987 S.C. Acts 168.
9. Id. § 2.
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a circuit solicitor. 10 It also provides for a prompt adversarial
hearing on the question of obscenity following any seizure.1"
As a matter of constitutional interpretation, however, Hall
remains of great precedential value. Because the new obscenity
statute is silent regarding the issuance of warrants for seizure of
allegedly obscene materials, the validity of such warrants will be
judged solely by a constitutional standard. Even under this approach, the result in cases such as Hall will not change.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that governments may use "the power of search and seizure as an adjunct to a system for the suppression of objectionable publications." 2 Because books, pamphlets, magazines, motion pictures,
videotapes, and other publications are presumed to fall within
the protection of the first amendment, the Court has consistently required that warrants identify with particularity the allegedly obscene materials to be seized.
One of the Court's earliest pronouncements in this area
came in Marcus v. Search Warrants.3 The Marcus Court had
before it six warrants issued by a Missouri state court authorizing "any peace officer . . .to search [a magazine distributor's
place of business] . . .and seize [obscene materials]."1 4 Pursuant to the warrants, police seized some 11,000 magazines, books,
and photographs. The Court invalidated the warrants on fourteenth amendment due process grounds rather than fourth
amendment particularity grounds. Nevertheless, it rejected the
argument that allegedly obscene materials were like any other
form of contraband. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court,
noted that "[tihe line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may be legitimately regulated, suppressed, or punished is finely drawn. . . .The separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for. . . sensitive tools."' 5
In a separate, concurring opinion, Justices Black and Douglas
reasoned that the warrants ran afoul of the fourth amendment
particularity requirement. 16

10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-435(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. § 16-15-435(B).
Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717, 724 (1961).
Id.
Id. at 722.
Id. at 731 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958)).
Id. at 738-39.
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Four years later, in Stanford v.Texas, 7 a unanimous Court
accepted the position espoused by Black and Douglas in Marcus.
The Court relied on the fourth amendment particularity requirement to invalidate a warrant authorizing seizure of "books,
records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures,
recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party of Texas."' 8 Stanford reaffirmed the distinction
between allegedly unlawful publications and other forms of contraband and explained the rationale supporting it. Because of
the special solicitude given various published materials by the
first amendment, "the [fourth amendment] requirement that
warrants must particularly describe the 'things to be seized' is to
be accorded the most scrupulous exactitude when the 'things'
are books, and the basis for their seizure is the ideas which they
contain."' 9 Although Stanford concerned books of a political nature, no principled reason exists for distinguishing the seizure in
that case from the seizure at issue in Hall. Both were aimed at
the content of speech rather than its medium.
Under any objective reading, the Hall warrant fails to meet
the standard set forth in Stanford. Instead, it leaves the scope of
the search and seizure "to the whim of the officers charged with
executing the warrant."20 Therefore, even absent the provisions
of section 16-15-270(e), the Hall warrant runs afoul of the fourth
amendment particularity requirement.
Although the Hall court made no mention of any other procedural shortcoming in the case, the seizure is also constitutionally infirm in one other respect: it occurred in the absence of
probable cause that any of the seized videotapes were obscene.2 '
17. 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
18. Id. at 477-78.
19. Id. at 485. This is not to suggest that a magistrate must apply a "higher standard" of probable cause when he issues a warrant to seize materials that he has determined to be obscene. See New York v. P.J. Video, Inc. 475 U.S. 868 (1986) (application
for warrant authorizing seizure of materials presumptively protected by the first amendment to be evaluated under same standard of probable cause used to review warrant
applications generally).
20. Stanford, 379 U.S. at 485.
21. See, e.g., Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979) (warrant particularly
describing two films previously purchased by officers insufficient to support search of
premises for materials other than those identified). The Court noted in dictum that even
assuming the validity of the search for the two specified films, "there was not sufficient
probable cause to pursue a search beyond looking for additional copies of [those] films."
Id. at 325.
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Again, because of the special protection afforded various forms
of speech by the first amendment, fourth amendment jurisprudence requires that police obtain legally sufficient warrants
before they seize any allegedly obscene materials.22 No warrants
are to be issued unless supported by "probable cause upon oath
or affirmation."23 Probable cause, in turn, exists only when a
magistrate, considering the totality of the circumstances, determines that criminal activity is probably afoot.2"
The Hall seizure plainly fails to meet these standards.
Judge Floyd had viewed none of the forty-five tapes at issue
when he issued the warrant.25 While the police may have had
probable cause to seize single copies of the tapes viewed by
Floyd,28 they had no indication that any other tapes in the store
might be obscene. The seizure apparently proceeded on the officers' notions that since four purchased tapes were obscene,
other tapes in the store might be obscene as well. This sort of
inductive reasoning as a basis for the seizure cannot pass constitutional muster.
In Roaden v. Kentucky 7 the Supreme Court invalidated the
warrantless seizure of an allegedly obscene film even though
made incident to an arrest for public exhibition of the film. The
rationale supporting the decision is grounded in first amendment concerns. The seizure in Roaden proceeded solely on the
police officer's conclusion that the film was obscene; prior to the

22.
23.
24.
25.

See infra text accompanying notes 25-30.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
The Supreme Court never has held that a warrant for search and seizure of

allegedly obscene materials must be issued by a magistrate who actually has viewed the
material. See New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 874 n.5 (1986) (magistrate need

not view allegedly obscene material in making probable cause determination if provided
with reasonably specific affidavit describing content of material). The problem with the
Hall warrant, then, is not merely that Judge Floyd did not view the forty-five tapes
before the seizure but that apparently no police officer viewed them either. There simply
was no factual basis upon which to make a probable cause determination.
26. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973). The Heller Court upheld the seizure
of a single copy of an allegedly obscene film pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate

who had reviewed the film. Heller, a movie exhibitor, argued that first amendment considerations required an adversarial proceeding to determine the obscenity of the film

before a warrant for its seizure issued. The Court rejected the argument but did state
that if other copies of the film were not available, "the [trial] court should permit the

seized film to be copied so that showing can be continued pending a judicial determination of the obscenity issue in an adversary proceeding." Id. at 492-93.
27. 413 U.S. 496 (1973).
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seizure, no magistrate had any opportunity to "focus searchingly
on the question of obscenity." ' Such a seizure, the Court concluded, "presents essentially the same restraint on expression as
the seizure of all the books in a bookstore. Such precipitate action by a police officer, without the authority of a constitutionally sufficient warrant, is plainly a form of prior restraint and is,
in those circumstances, unreasonable under Fourth Amendment
' 29
standards.
The facts in Hall, with few exceptions, are the same as
those in Roaden. The seizure of the forty-five tapes proceeded
solely on the police officers' conclusions, unsupported by a magistrate's determination or any evidence other than mere speculation, that they were obscene. Clearly, such conjecture is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. Thus, any warrant
issued in the case could not have authorized seizure of the fortyfive tapes. Without a constitutionally sufficient warrant, the
seizure is unreasonable under Roaden30
In short, the South Carolina Supreme Court could have
pointed to any number of constitutional infirmities besetting the
seizure in Hall. While the repeal of section 16-15-270 of the
South Carolina Code has eviscerated the statutory underpinnings of the decision, the opinion remains a viable state interpretation of the federal Constitution. Even under the new state
obscenity statute, police seizures of allegedly obscene materials
must conform to the procedural requirements of the Constitution. Hall gives some indication of the floor of federal rights beneath which state police activity in seizing allegedly obscene

28. Id. at 506 (quoting Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717, 732).
29. Id. at 504.
30. The state might have attempted to justify the Hall seizure as a "plain view"
seizure of contraband. See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 42-43 (1963). This argu-

ment, which is clearly at odds with Roaden and Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319,
326 n.5 (1979), has been rejected by most state courts that have ruled on the issue. See
Annotation, Seizure of UnderscribedPapers,54 A.L.R.4TH 391, 499-503 (1987). Perhaps
because the issue seems so clear from prior opinions, the Court has not had occasion to

address the question directly.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol40/iss1/5

6

1988]

CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW
Monts
and Nelson: Constitutional
Law

materials may not sink.
William L. Monts, III

II. FORCIBLE MEDIATION OF FEDERAL PRETRIAL DETAINEE HELD
UNCONSTITUTIONAL

In United States v. Charterss the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of under what, if any, conditions
the government may order a patient in a federal treatment facility to be medicated forcibly and unwillingly with antipsychotic
drugs. Charters was indicted in late 1983 for making threats
against the President of the United States, in violation of federal
law.2 He was found incompetent to stand trial, and the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ordered
him to be confined to the Federal Correctional Institute in
Butner, North Carolina. The district court reviewed Charters'
commitment five times and returned him to Butner each time.33
The district court, upon the government's motion, entered
an order to permit medical personnel at Butner to forcibly medicate Charters with antipsychotic drugs, pending appeal to the
Fourth Circuit. The district court identified three governmental
interests 4 and, based on the testimony of a psychiatrist at
Butner, concluded that these governmental interests outweighed
the individual's interests. The court based its ruling upon its
conclusion that the state's "duty" to treat the medical needs of
pretrial detainees justified forcibly medicating Charters. The
district court also concluded that Charters was not competent to
make decisions concerning his medical care, in essence equating
his competence to stand trial (legal competence) with competence to make personal health care decisions (medical
competence). 35
Prior to addressing the issue of the government's authority

31. 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987).
32. Charters was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1982).
33. 829 F.2d at 482 n.1. The dates of review were June 5, 1984; December 11, 1984;
March 22, 1985; July 11, 1985; and October 11, 1985.
34. The government claimed that it had interests in preventing violence, maintaining the competence of the individual to stand trial, and a parens patriae interest in
protecting the health of its citizens. Id. at 492.
35. Id. at 482.
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to medicate a patient forcibly in a federal treatment facility,"6
the court of appeals considered the threshold question of
whether the federal government had any justification in detaining Charters. The court found that Charters was improperly in
custody because the district court had failed to follow procedures mandated by federal statutes governing the detention of
mentally ill persons accused of federal crimes. 38 Based on the
district court finding that Charters showed no promise of becoming competent to stand trial, federal custody should have
been cut off at four months and transfer made to a state care
facility.39 The court found that Charters' continued
detention
40
command.
Congress'
to
contrary
was "directly
Despite this holding, the court of appeals remanded this issue to the district court because state facilities might be unavailable and Charters could be found dangerous. If such were the
case, he could be maintained in federal custody under Chapter
18, section 4246 of the United States Code.41
The almost certain conclusion that Charters would be released from federal custody did not deter the court of appeals
from considering the subsequent issue of the legality of forcible
medication. Although the decision regarding the detention may
appear to have made this issue of forced medication moot, the
court acted to prevent the possibility of Charters being medicated prior to the district court decision on remand or afterwards, if he were to remain in federal custody.
The court found that a mentally ill pretrial detainee, if
medically (as distinguished from legally) competent, has a constitutionally protected right to decide whether to forego medical

36. It is important to view any discussion of the individual's rights in the case in
light of the court's own pronouncement that the decision here addresses only the rights
of a pretrial detainee and expresses no views concerning the rights of convicted prisoners
facing forcible medication while in confinement. See id. at 499 n.30.
37. In his petition for habeas corpus, Charters had not raised the issue of the legality of his detention. The court considered that it was presented by the underlying dispute that if he could not be legally detained, he could not be forcibly medicated. Id. at
484.
38. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241 to -47 (1982).
39. There are limited exceptions to the requirement of transfer to a state institution under § 4246 of chapter 18 of the United States Code, but the court found no such
exceptions on the record. 829 F.2d at 486-87.
40. Id. at 487.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) (1982).
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treatment. Furthermore, in the absence of any emergency, 42 this
individual interest outweighs any governmental interest in medicating him against his will. In striking this balance, the court
considered the facts of this case in light of United States Supreme Court's decision in Youngberg v. Romeo.43 While Romeo
also involved the forcible medication of a mentally ill patient,
the court found that Romeo did not dictate the result in Charters due to several important distinctions between the two
cases. 44 Additionally, the court of appeals stated that even if a
patient is found medically incompetent, such a finding does not
extinguish a patient's constitutional rights. The court then must
examine the available alternatives when it makes treatment de4
cisions on the patient's behalf. "
At a glance, the court appears to determine the issue of
forced medication by the balancing interests of the individual
with those of the government. Yet, apparently unconvinced of
the government's claimed interests 4 e the court focuses the majority of its analysis on the question of defining medical competence and addressing how decisions are to be made for those who
are not medically competent. In its discussion of this issue, the
court first pointed out the difference between medical and legal
competence,' 7 which the district court had failed to do. Second,
the court noted that this issue had seldom arisen in litigation
but frequently had been discussed. 48 The court took a commonsense approach in dealing with this question by holding that the
correct method for determining whether an individual is medically competent is to evaluate whether that individual's medical

42. An emergency situation is one "in which violence or the imminent deterioration

of a patient will occur in the absence of forcible medication." 829 F.2d at 484.
43. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). In Romeo the Supreme Court balanced the right of the

individual against the demands of an organized society in determining that a profoundly
mentally retarded man was entitled only to an assurance that professional judgment had

been exercised in deciding what care he would receive. This is the "professional judgment" process, which defers a mental incompetent's medical decisions to those charged
with his care. 829 F.2d at 488, 497. See infra note 45.

44. 829 F.2d at 488-90. The primary distinction between the two cases was the
possibility of permanent mental incapacitation by the use of antipsychotic drugs in

Chartersversus the use of temporary and nonthreatening physical restraints in Romeo.
45. Id. at 484. The three methods discussed by the court are the "professional

judgment," "substituted judgment," and "best interest of the patient" tests.
46. Id. at 492-94.
47. Id. at 495.

48. Id. at 496 n.26.
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decisions have a rational basis.49 Based upon this and the substantial evidence in the record regarding the possibly severe side
effects of antipsychotic drugs, 50 the court concluded that Charters appeared to be medically competent and, therefore, should
not be forcibly medicated.
Although the issue of medical competence in this case was
established prior to remand to the district court,51 this test may
fail to yield such an obvious conclusion when less dangerous
drugs are used or when the more severe side effects of antipsychotic drugs are lessened by advances in medicine. The Fourth
Circuit held that when a patient is found to be medically incompetent, either by his being unable to communicate his desires or
having no rational basis for them, the court should apply the
"best interests of the patient" test only if it is impossible to ascertain what the patient would decide if he were competent.52
The courts could bypass this two-tiered test to order forcible
medication only in the event of an emergency situation.
Simply put, the Fourth Circuit in Charters has created a
four-step test: (1) Does an emergency situation exist? (2) If not,
is the patient medically competent? (3) If not, can the court determine what the patient would do if he were competent? (4) If
not, what is in the patient's best interest?
While this test apparently works to achieve the court's
stated goal of preserving the individual's right to be free from
nonconsensual invasions of his person, a more simplified process
would yield the same results.
Because the court states it would only use the "substituted
judgment" test where the evidence is clear and convincing, this
step is virtually worthless. The court does give one example of a
decision which would pass this test-when a patient's strict religious convictions would prevent medical treatment. Such a case,
however, would only raise further questions, including the

49. Id. at 496.
50. For example, see id. at 483 n.2 (explanation of Tardive Dyskinesia, the most
severe side effect caused by the use of antipsychotic drugs).
51. Compare 829 F.2d at 483 n.2 with 829 F.2d at 496. The only standard the
Fourth Circuit requires to find an individual medically competent is that he have a "rational reason" for his actions. In view of the possibly severe side effects of antipsychotic
drugs, it is unimaginable that a court could classify a refusal to take such drugs as
irrational.
52. This is the "substituted judgment" test. 829 F.2d at 497-98.
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strength and sincerity of those convictions and the government's
parens patriae interest if the patient's decision could result in
his death. 8 Most often the "substituted judgment" of an individual would be conjecture based upon possibly inaccurate perceptions of the individual's thoughts and beliefs. It is difficult to
imagine a set of circumstances that would yield a different
result
under these two tests. In fact, the court itself points out that a
patient's religious beliefs would be considered in deciding his
"best interest. ' 5 The court, however, gives this as the only example in justifying the "substantial judgment" test. By removing this test, the court could take out at least one step in an
already confusing process and still accomplish the same result.
In Charters,the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals properly
recognized that the individual's right to avoid unwanted touching, based upon the doctrine of informed consent, is an integral
part of his constitutionally protected freedom. Although its analysis is clouded by the discussion of lesser issues, the court recognizes the danger in allowing governmental invasion of the individual's freedom of thought. The court's opinion clearly
establishes that, in the Fourth Circuit, federal detainees may not
be forcibly medicated simply for the purpose of making them
competent to stand trial.
Jeffrey M. Nelson

53. See In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972); In re Brooks Estate, 32 III. 2d
361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
54. 829 F.2d at 495-96 n.25.
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